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Abstract
‘Taking time seriously’ is an enduring human concern and questions about the nature of 
time bear heavily on the meaning of childhood. In the context of the continuing debates on 
readiness for school, ‘taking time seriously’ has contributed to policies on ‘early interven-
tions’ which claim to support children in reaching their full potential but limit this potential 
when enacted in practice. Much of current policymaking takes the meaning of time for 
granted within a ‘quantitative’ view of time as a neutral, standardised parameter. In eve-
ryday educational practice, this view of time may lead to an excessive preoccupation with 
assessing standardised characteristics of ‘school ready’ children, who are expected to fol-
low a uniform path of development predetermined by their biological clock. However, the 
quantitative view of time has been challenged both in philosophical and scientific thought 
by an understanding of time as complex, irreversible and emergent in the present. George 
Herbert Mead’s ‘philosophy of the present’ and Ilya Prigogine’s ‘arrow of time’ point to 
important implications of a ‘complex’ view of time for readiness for school as an event 
rather than a fixed set of characteristics that children should possess upon entry to primary 
school. Engaging in educational practice as it unfolds in the present also calls for ethics 
that are not focused on adhering to fixed moral universals but on our actions ‘here and 
now’ and attending to the ethical meaning that arises in children’s responses to our actions.
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Children only get one chance at education and every child deserves the 
opportunity to reach their full potential… childhood is short, and when it comes 
to a child’s education, there’s no time to waste.
(Nicky Morgan, Department for Education 2016a, p. 4)
Introduction
The concern about time articulated by the former English Education Secretary Nicky 
Morgan is shared by policymakers in many countries. The idea that ‘there’s no time to 
waste’ often surfaces as an ‘urgent’ need to reform education and ‘swiftly’ tackle ‘under-
performance’ (DfE 2016a). In the international policy space, every 3  years the ‘ticking 
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clock’ of PISA confers prestige on education systems whose 15-year-olds have ‘outper-
formed’ others in the Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD 2015). 
In the UK, a poor PISA result generates intense media pressure to improve, with head-
lines such as: ‘Clock ticking for Welsh schools with just two years until Pisa tests’ (Evans 
2013) and ‘Pisa: ‘Five years left’ to save Scottish curriculum after shocking result’ (Seith 
2016). In 2017, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
developed a new international comparative study centred on assessments of five-year-olds 
within four domains of: ‘emerging literacy, emerging numeracy, self-regulation, empathy 
and trust’ (OECD 2017, p. 17). Motivated by belief in ‘early intervention’, this new ‘baby 
PISA’ (Pence 2017; Moss and Urban 2017) has drawn early childhood into a global stand-
ardised assessment regime that is unable to see children’s educational experience ‘through 
any other lens than the one provided by PISA’ (Urban 2017, p. 20). In this context, time of 
which there is none ‘to waste’, becomes a pedagogical resource from which maximum per-
formance has to be extracted to ensure predetermined future benefits.
A focus on a predetermined future also underpins traditional definitions of readiness for 
school that identify children’s developmental capabilities, considered crucial for a smooth 
home-school transition, such as age-specific social, emotional and motor development, 
language, cognition and learning skills (Kagan et  al. 1995). More recently, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has tried to shift focus from children’s capabilities to 
caring environments that enhance a more holistic development of the child. This broader 
approach, informed by socio-cultural theory (Gardiner and Kosmitzki 2002; Rogoff 2003), 
views readiness for school as a ‘good start in life’, within nurturing, safe environments 
that enable children to be ‘physically healthy, emotionally secure, socially competent and 
able to learn’ (UNICEF 2012, p. 6). However, a reductive concern about children’s capa-
bilities at the time of home-school transition prevails in countries where policymakers 
prioritise a quantitative view of time, captured here through the metaphor of the ‘ticking 
clock’ of PISA.1 In the USA for example, actions taken in response to the recommenda-
tion by the National Educational Goals Panel (1991, p. vi) that, by the year 2000, ‘all chil-
dren in America will start school ready to learn’ have included opening a government-
funded Office of School Readiness (Alabama) to get four to five-year-olds ‘school ready’. 
In England, readiness for school has been reduced to ‘baseline assessment’, a single score 
of children’s performance in communication, language, literacy and mathematics, car-
ried out in the first weeks of school and used to monitor future performance (DfE 2014, 
2017). These approaches rely on ‘early interventions’, in the belief that ‘earlier is better’ 
and that intervention requires a formal, centrally designed curriculum to be ‘transmitted 
and formally assessed’ (Bingham and Whitbread 2012, p. 14). Children are assumed here 
to follow a uniform path of development, predetermined by their biological clock and cap-
tured by the dominant discourse of developmental psychology (Wood and Hedges 2016). 
Within these debates, school readiness has thus been conceptualised either as a fixed set 
of characteristics of ‘school ready’ children or as the ‘appropriate’ socio-cultural contexts 
and relationships that enhance the development of such characteristics.2 Both of these 
1 The metaphor of the ‘ticking clock’ of PISA is used in this paper to represent ‘quantitative’ time and 
associated imperatives of speed, urgency, and acceleration of time. These meanings are also connected to 
‘clocking practices’ in early childhood education (Pacini-Ketchabaw 2012) and the material-discursive sig-
nificance of the clock as ‘an apparatus’ that produces particular material effects in Early Years classrooms.
2 There is no scope to detail here the long history of debates on school readiness since tests of ‘reading 
readiness’ were introduced in the USA in the 1920s as a measure of children’s overall ‘readiness’ to start 
school (May and Campbell 1981). School readiness gained renewed attention in the 1990 s, with models 
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conceptualisations, however, impose ostensibly ‘objective’ attributes and temporal bounda-
ries which are abstracted from time as subjectively ‘lived’. By reducing the complexity of 
‘temporal matters’ (Alhadeff-Jones 2017) to the logics of urgency, speed and ‘early inter-
vention’, they limit the way time may be experienced and learned by children. In elevating 
efficient time management and performance outcomes to fixed moral universals, they also 
give rise to instrumentalist relationships in educational practice.
This paper sets a path yet to be fully explored in contemporary notions of readiness 
for school by examining their underpinning view of time. It also seeks to contribute to 
the study of time in education, which continues to be a ‘fragmented and underdeveloped 
scientific territory’ (Alhadeff-Jones 2017, p. 33). Looming large in the current debate on 
readiness for school has been the Enlightenment view of the child as innocent, malleable 
and ready to mature with time (Hendrick 1997; Ryan 2011). To better understand the idea 
of children’s readiness to mature with time, we therefore need to examine the notion of 
time itself and the predominant view, from the Enlightenment period onwards, of time as 
a universal, neutral parameter, divided into equal portions of itself in the form of stand-
ardised units such as hours, days, weeks or years. Although this most basic, ‘quantitative 
approach’ to time (Bouton 2014) has been developed outside our subjective lived expe-
rience, it imposes on us the standardised regularity of the ‘ticking clock’, as well as the 
prediction and control of the Enlightenment’s scientific-rationalist thinking. ‘Quantitative’ 
time as an independent variable of classical physics is reversible: given appropriate initial 
conditions, classical Newtonian equations can be used to predict the future and ‘retrodict’ 
the past. However, an essential premise of prediction and ‘retrodiction’ is that complex-
ity is reduced and important contextual features are ignored. With the exception of simple 
mechanistic systems, most aspects of the world are complex and questions about the mean-
ing of time have produced a number of diverse answers, both within philosophical and 
scientific thought. Philosophical thought offers ‘at least five possible strategies… to con-
front the problem of time’ (Bouton 2014, p. 3). In ‘confronting’ this problem, this paper 
explores a ‘complex’ view of time developed by the philosopher, George Herbert Mead 
and the complexity scientist, Ilya Prigogine. Mead and Prigogine were preoccupied with 
‘taking time seriously’ (Mead 2002, p. 184) and arrived at conclusions that have important 
implications for understanding readiness for school and for ethics in educational practice. 
Mead’s (2002) ‘philosophy of the present’ and Prigogine’s (1996) ‘arrow of time’ view 
of time as complex, irreversible and emergent show ways in which children’s readiness 
for school is bound up with schools’ readiness: the degree to which schools are ready to 
respond to children’s needs and capabilities ‘here and now’. But let us first focus on differ-
ent explanations of the nature of time and how they bear on the meaning of childhood.
of school readiness and transition to school developed by Meisels (1999) and Rimm-Kaufman and Pianta 
(2000) respectively. Meisels developed a standardised assessment of school readiness to help identify gaps 
and interventions whilst Rimm-Kaufman and Pianta identified the qualities of the teacher-parent relation-
ships necessary for supporting children’s adjustment on transition to school within a more dynamic, ‘eco-
logical’ perspective.
Footnote 2 (continued)
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The Nature of Time and the Meaning of Childhood
Confronting the enduring question about the nature of time may involve ‘at least five 
strategies’ (Bouton 2014, p. 3). The most basic, ‘quantitative’ strategy goes back to 
Aristotle’s explanation of how time and motion define each other. Time, in Aristotle’s 
view, is measured by regular motion which becomes a standard for measuring all other 
movement. This means that ‘it is not time that measures movement but a certain regular 
movement that measures all other movements by way of temporal mediation’ (p. 4). 
Whilst the quantitative approach has proved extremely useful in science and daily life, it 
falls short of explaining the nature of change other than movement. It does not get at the 
nature of time, because it is placed outside of our experience as lived:
As banal an experience as boredom suffices to bring out the extent to which meas-
urable time does not exhaust the reality of time: there are minutes that last for 
hours and inversely… In reality, I never measure time but only the consciousness I 
have of it. (Bouton 2014, p. 5)
Our experience of time as lived resists ‘objective’ measurement and highlights the 
importance of the ‘subjectivist approach’, which defines time in terms of conscious-
ness. The subjectivist view of time (advanced by Kant, Husserl, and Bergson, discussed 
below) illuminates time as experienced, but at the price of ‘wordly’ time, the time of 
nature that transcends the finite human subjectivity. Here, Bouton notes three strategies 
that transcend the objectivist-subjectivist dichotomy. Firstly, within Hegelian dialectics, 
time arises both in nature and human consciousness. For Hegel (1970, p. 257) time is 
not an abstraction that is external to nature and to consciousness: ‘Things are in time 
because they are finite; they do not pass away because they are in time, but are them-
selves that which is temporal… It is therefore the process of actual things that consti-
tutes time’. Secondly, Heidegger (1962) sought to grasp time in all of its facets as ‘tem-
porality’, pertaining to being in the world that encompasses both human being (Dasein) 
and non-human being. For Heidegger, time is the limit of all understanding of being and 
being can only be understood ‘with time as its standpoint’ (Bouton 2014, p. 11). Impor-
tantly, Heidegger posited that we can only understand time from our mortal, finite van-
tage point or, in other words, the meaning of time is laid bare in death. Thirdly, Ricoeur 
(1988) has offered a way out of the ‘maze of temporality’ through narrative, whereby 
narrating an event is an act of ‘reinscribing a fragment of lived time in the universal 
calendar of the time of the world’ (Bouton 2014 p. 12). However, as noted by Bouton, 
approaching time from the standpoint of narrative leaves the ‘blind spot’ on the tem-
porality of action. Bouton therefore suggests another approach to understanding time, 
which explores the ways in which freedom to act relies on the capacity of time ‘to be 
modified and configured by freedom’ (p. 15). The problem of time is thus not just that 
of its nature but also of the relation between freedom and time. Once the link between 
time and causal determinism is severed, time becomes the ‘auxiliary of freedom’ (p. 
209). The essential condition of freedom is:
…the plasticity of time. If time is entirely subject to causal determinism, freedom 
is an illusion… freedom presupposes a contingent future, composed, in what con-
cerns human acts, of possibilities that might or might not transpire. (p. 210)
In exploring the connection between time and freedom, Bouton draws on the work 
of Levinas (1987), highlighting how one’s freedom is about creating possibilities for 
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oneself and for others, over whom one has no control. This can be illustrated through 
the relation of parenting:
The child is at once my child, the child of my flesh, a being in whom I find myself, 
who concerns me, for whom I am responsible, and a stranger, a being who is not my 
creature, who escapes my control and is destined to leave me. The future of the child 
is beyond my possibilities, beyond my projects. (Bouton 2014, p. 243)
These diverse approaches to time bear heavily on the meaning of childhood and the notion 
of readiness for school. The quantitative time underpins psychological theories of child 
development and definitions of readiness for school as emotional, cognitive and develop-
mental characteristics possessed by children upon entry to school. Developmental psy-
chology produces ontological propositions, such as that until children have achieved the 
expected level of development for their age, they are not ready for tasks associated with 
the next level (Kagan and Rigby 2003). Such propositions fix readiness for school and nar-
rowly focus educational practice on its assessment. In the context of ongoing debates about 
assessing readiness for school (Dockett and Perry 2002; Kagan and Rigby 2003; Snow 
2006), Bingham and Whitbread (2012) emphasise their lack of consensus about the pur-
pose of early education. For Bingham and Whitebread (2012, p. 6), the key question is not 
‘whether a child is ready to learn’ but ‘how adults can best support the processes of learn-
ing’. The question, therefore, is not what children need to know or be able to do when they 
start school, but what schools need to do to meet the needs of children. This re-formulated 
question about the readiness of schools (Fabian and Dunlop 2002) has been addressed in 
countries such as Finland, Norway and Sweden through ‘social pedagogy’, which supports 
children’s social, emotional and intellectual development in ways that are firmly embedded 
in multiple social contexts (Bingham and Whitbread 2012).
However, both readiness for school and readiness of schools run the risk of exhausting 
themselves in pursuit of more accurate ways of assessing ‘objective’ attributes of ‘school 
ready’ children or characteristics of schools that are ready to meet the children’s needs. A 
closer scrutiny of the ‘rival paradigms’ of developmental psychology and social pedagogy 
suggests that both paradigms may be seen as the ‘same field of practice’, where ‘children 
become means to imagined or envisioned ends’ (Ryan 2011, p. 450). By tracing the devel-
opment of Rousseau’s ideas about the education of Émile, Ryan notes how both Émile’s 
tutor and a modern child-centered educator may remain ‘invisible’, so that:
the child at play was to feel free while unknowingly undergoing a programme of 
training, the strategic aim of which was to produce self-regulating individuals who 
identified with a common [social] purpose. (p. 449)
The future of the child is thus confined within the projects of developmental psychology 
and social pedagogy and the adult mindset in which they originate. However, the ‘subjec-
tivist’ perspective on time is a reminder that adults can, at best, only have a partial under-
standing, coloured by their own perspective, of what it means to be a child. Within this 
perspective, the notion of childhood as a time during which children simply lack adults’ 
categories for analysis and ‘differentiation’ has been challenged as follows:
Do we have the right to comprehend the time, the space of the child as an undifferen-
tiation of our time, of our space, etc.? … This is to reduce the child’s experience to 
our own (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 203)
Childhood may thus be ‘short’ for policymakers and teachers concerned with the ‘urgent’ 
need to reform education, but the resulting use of time as a resource not to be ‘wasted’ 
 A. Bates 
1 3
may lead to ‘clocking practices’ (Pacini-Ketchabaw 2012) that compress the time devoted 
to class activities and put children in a state of constant mobilisation. Even within adult 
time–space, regimes that valorise speed in pursuit of ‘maximum output in the minimum 
time expended’ (Adam 2006, p. 124; Olma 2007) have also been reported to result in ‘dis-
tress at work, tiredness, exhaustion, depression [and] burnout’ (Alhadeff-Jones 2017, p. 
150).
From the standpoint of Hegelian dialectics, despite opposing definitions of readiness 
for school, as a set of characteristics of ‘school ready’ children or the contexts in which 
such characteristics develop, childhood has continued to be instrumentalised ‘toward the 
perpetuation of a selfsame future’ (Lakind and Adsit-Morris 2018, p. 32). This instrumen-
talist framing has been reflected in the ‘hegemonic educational temporalizations and paces’ 
of schooling (Papastephanou 2018, p. 97), deployed to predetermine, measure and control 
learning and its future outcomes. In this context, situating educational practice more firmly 
in the ‘here and now’ is important not as a ‘disavowal of the future, but of future-orienta-
tions that negate children as bearers of their own experience and agents of their own pur-
pose’ (Lakind and Adsit-Morris 2018, p. 36). To recover the present in educational prac-
tice, this paper now turns to Mead’s (2002) ‘philosophy of the present’ and Prigogine’s 
(1996) explication of the ‘arrow of time’.
Prigogine’s ‘Arrow of Time’ and Mead’s ‘Philosophy of the Present’
Mead’s ‘philosophy of the present’ (1932/2002) has strong resonances with the complex-
ity science view of time as unidirectional (irreversible), as captured by Prigogine’s (1996) 
metaphor of the ‘arrow of time’. The ‘arrow of time’ emphasises the irreversibility of many 
processes that complex systems undergo as a result of fluctuations, instability and multiple 
choices, in contrast to classical Newtonian mechanics, where time is a neutral parameter, 
a universal dimension ‘common to all observers’ (Prigogine 1996, p. 164). The regularity, 
order and stability expressed in classical mechanics in the form of time-reversible equa-
tions correspond to ‘approximations’ or ‘idealizations’, for example friction is ignored 
to make the pendulum move reversibly (p. 18). This approximation is problematic for 
Prigogine, because there is no absolute void (and consequently no frictionless condition) in 
nature. Although nature involves both time-irreversible and time-reversible processes, the 
former are the rule and the latter the exception. The irreversible, time-oriented processes 
that Prigogine investigated are characterized by increasing entropy, defined as a number 
of states into which a system may evolve over time. In classical physics, preoccupied with 
closed systems, i.e. systems isolated from the environment, in states close to equilibrium, 
entropy is viewed as a loss of a system’s thermal energy that is subsequently unavailable 
for doing useful work. Prigogine, on the other hand, studied the workings of ‘dissipative 
structures’, i.e. open systems in which there is an exchange of energy and matter with the 
environment. His definition of dissipative structures encompasses many open systems 
which are maintained by continuous flows of energy, such as chemical reactions, ecosys-
tems and human social behaviour. Irreversibility means that it is impossible to undo the 
effects of certain chemical reactions: once ‘mixed’ together, the original molecular struc-
tures cannot be ‘un-mixed’. Similarly:
You cannot reverse the evolution of the universe, even theoretically, and you can-
not deduce or reproduce the past. You cannot predict its future, except in terms of 
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scenarios that depend on a never‐ending series of bifurcations — crossroads in the 
chain of causality. (Prigogine 1983, p. 86)
The ‘arrow of time’ entails that the future of open systems is not given, but is under 
perpetual construction and, therefore, ‘no formulation of the laws of nature that does 
not take into account this constructive role of time can ever be satisfactory’ (Prigogine 
1996, p. 56). As a scientist interested in philosophy, Prigogine thus emphasises that, 
contrary to classical science descriptions of present and past as identical and revers-
ible and the world as a static, ‘timeless automaton’, our everyday experience tells us 
that ‘tomorrow is not contained in today’: in our everyday life, we experience activity, 
change (Prigogine 1982, p. 25). The question about what the flow of time ‘preserves, 
creates and destroys’ is a central human concern (Prigogine 1996, p. 154). As a phi-
losopher interested in science, Mead (2002) started with investigating how time is expe-
rienced in our everyday life, arriving at answers about the nature of time that resonate 
with Prigogine’s explanations of the ‘arrow of time’.
Central to Mead’s ‘philosophy of the present’ is a view of time as irreversible, expe-
rienced in the present and rooted in the social nature of the present. Like Prigogine, 
Mead was also critical of the Newtonian notion of time as a mere parameter. Newtonian 
time as a ‘mere passage’, a simple timeline ‘divided into equal portions of itself’ was for 
Mead an illusion and example of an ‘unwarranted use of abstraction’ (p. 332). The range 
of applications of Newtonian time was, according to Mead, limited to experimental data 
obtained in tightly controlled (laboratory) environments. Time as experienced in our 
consciousness in our day to day life is complex, with present, past and future permeat-
ing one another and undergoing perpetual reconstruction in the present. Here, Mead 
worked with the ideas of time and consciousness developed by Henri Bergson (1910) 
and in particular his idea of ‘pure duration’ which distinguishes ‘quantitative’ and ‘sub-
jective’ time, experienced in consciousness. Pure duration, according to Bergson, is:
the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego 
lets itself  live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former 
states… in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as 
one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into 
an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to 
speak, into one another… even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive 
them in one another… just because they are so closely connected… (1910 u. 100)
Bergson contrasted this complex view of time with a superficial idea of time where the 
organic whole formed of past and present states is reduced to a sequence of separate 
events. Elaborating on this point, Mead maintained that present, past and future are 
not measurable dimensions, but rather the distinction between them is relational, in the 
sense that the relation to the present is the ground for the ‘past-ness’ of the past and the 
‘future-ness’ of the future (Murphy 2002). The key causal relation between past, pre-
sent and future is that of emergence: the appearance of ‘unique events which are distin-
guishable from each other through their qualitative nature’ (Mead 2002, p. 51). In place 
of Newtonian time as a sequenced, measurable quantity, Mead thus introduced a more 
dynamic, complex concept of time, inextricably linked with the emergent event:
the occurrence of something which is more than the processes that have led up to 
it and which… adds to later passages a content that they would not otherwise have 
possessed. (p. 332)
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Mead’s point that the ‘world is a world of events’ (p. 35) and that time ‘can only arise 
through the ordering of passage of …unique [emergent] events’ (p. 338) resonates with 
Prigogine’s (1996, p. 5) observation that, in order to understand complex systems, ‘we need 
not only laws, but also events that bring an element of radical novelty’ to their description.
The present has a ‘social’ nature through its capacity of being in more than one system, 
which is termed by Mead ‘sociality’:
Sociality is the capacity of being several things at once. The animal traverses the 
ground in pursuit of his prey, and is at once a part of the system of distribution of 
energies which makes his locomotion possible and a part of the jungle system which 
is a part of the life system on the surface of the inanimate globe… There is a genuine 
sociality in his relation to his environment and in his relation to the prey or to his 
mate or to his pack… (2002, p. 75)
For Mead, change is emergent and emergence is paradoxical: the appearance of a new 
event, ‘from the conditions under which it has appeared’ is simultaneously accompanied 
by the ‘carrying on of identical conditions from the past into the present’ (p. 75). Similarly, 
in the passage of time from the past into the future, the present object, such as the animal 
pursuing its prey, ‘is both the old and the new, and this holds for its relations to all other 
members of the system to which it belongs’ (p. 77). In the present, therefore, we simultane-
ously experience both continuity and change, or as Mead puts it, both the ‘old order’ and 
the ‘readjustments’ of change:
In the history of a community, the members carry over from an old order their char-
acters as determined by social relations into the readjustments of social change… So 
Rousseau had to find both sovereign and subject in the citizen, and Kant had to find 
both the giver of the moral law and subject of the law in the rational being. (p. 77)
The ideas about time expounded by Prigogine and Mead provide a radical departure from 
the quantitative, Newtonian time as a reversible, independent variable which retains the 
same quality as other variables change. The special contributions of Prigogine and Mead 
to the ‘strategies’ for confronting the question about the nature of time (Bouton 2014) rest 
on their insights into the primacy of events, emergence, the importance of the present and 
its social nature (‘sociality). The following sections explain how these insights support 
alternative approaches to readiness for school and educational practice, by focusing on: 
the present as the locus of reality; ‘taking on the role of the other’ and ethics in educational 
practice.
The Present as the Locus for Realising One’s ‘Full Potential’
In positing the present as the locus of reality, Mead (1932/2002) emphasised that it is in 
the present that possibilities emerge to discontinue the past and shape the future in novel 
ways. In the present, the emergent event creates with its uniqueness both a new past and 
a new future. On this account, readiness for school can be understood as an event, a pro-
cess which gradually unfolds in time rather than a fixed, static ‘property’ that children are 
assessed to either possess or lack upon entry to school. In the present, a child may gain (or 
lose) a myriad of chances at learning that arise in ongoing child-teacher interactions. These 
chances depend both on the child’s readiness to learn and the degree of her teacher’s readi-
ness to engage with teaching as a dynamic process of constantly producing and readjusting 
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a course of action within a situation (Joas 1996) rather than acting to a rigid, predetermined 
outcome or a fixed assessment of a child’s capabilities and needs. The meaning of what I 
do in my classroom is not fixed in advance though lesson objectives, learning outcomes, 
or my authority as a teacher, but arises in the children’s responses to my actions. Teaching 
within the quantitative, Newtonian timeframe, conceived as a ‘sequence of unitary acts’ 
comprising a uniformly passing reality (Joas and Scharmer 1999, p. 17), for example a 
series of discrete lessons built into a scheme of work and rigidly delivered to a plan, con-
strains the creativity of teacher’s actions. For Joas, the creativity of action is predicated on 
noticing the dynamism of the present as it unfolds and challenges our beliefs, taken-for-
granted assumptions and routines.3 When emergent events shatter our expectations:
Our perception must come to terms with new or different aspects of reality; action 
must be applied to different points of the world, or must restructure itself. This recon-
struction is a creative achievement on the part of the actor. If he succeeds in reorient-
ing the action on the basis of this changed perception and thus continuing with it, 
then something new enters the world: a new mode of action, which can gradually 
take root and thus itself become an unreflected routine. (Joas 1996, pp. 128-29)
Children are also capable of creative action, of ‘remaking (and not merely receiving) 
knowledge’, as long as the teacher provides conditions under which the future is ‘unwrit-
ten’ and ‘open’’ (Yarker 2016, p. 30). From the standpoint of complex time, schools’ readi-
ness to creatively respond to children’s needs and capabilities in the present may, therefore, 
be more effective in shaping their development than orienting children towards what they 
will need or should be able to do in the future.
The ‘taming’ of learning processes and practices through planning, controlling, assess-
ing and evaluating against predetermined goals is underpinned by a view of knowledge as 
‘stable’ (Olsson 2012, p. 89). Young children, however, prefer to stay in the processes of 
learning and knowledge production rather than to imitate ‘stable’ knowledge:
Children, when allowed to, seem to enjoy a certain kind of intense, undomesticated, 
and vital experimentation rather than looking for any kind of permanent and stable 
knowledge (ibid. p. 89)
Olsson (2012) recommends that teachers develop their everyday practice as a collectively 
constructed, open-ended process which is sensitive to children’s preferences and learning 
strategies. Crucial to this process are listening and careful observation as ways of sens-
ing the relation that the children already have to the subject and the underlying question: 
‘What are they after?’ (p. 97). Intervention in ‘children’s doings’ should be limited and 
approached ‘very cautiously’ (p. 93). Olsson (2012) found that allowing children to experi-
ment, at their own pace, with the ‘Magic of Language’ led to an ‘intensity’ of children’s 
engagement, as well as more creative and profound learning than that based on imitation or 
reproduction.
Mead’s view of the present as the locus of reality also challenges the standardised pace 
and timeline of children’s progress through school, with predetermined developmental 
3 Joas (1996) developed his theory by working with Mead’s philosophy of time. There are three elements 
of the creativity of action as ‘the way in which human beings exist in the world’: (a) a non-teleological ori-
entation, as a departure from a means-ends thinking, (b) an attitude which embraces both ‘spontaneity’ (or 
pre-reflective impulses and perceptions) and reflection, and (c) acting from a recognition of the self and oth-
ers as interdependent rather than atomised and autonomous (Joas and Scharmer 1999).
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milestones such as getting ready for school, transition to primary and then secondary 
education and preparing ‘for adult life’ (DfE 2016a, p. 8). This timeline is demarcated by 
regular assessment activities, as a measure schools’ accountability for ‘stretch[ing] every 
child… to reach their full potential’ (p. 10). This is based on an assumption that getting 
children through regular tests will enable them to leave primary school ‘with the essential 
building blocks to succeed at secondary’ (p. 20). However, the focus on ‘essential building 
blocks’ has proved time and again to be detrimental in education systems where the ‘tick-
ing clock’ of PISA sets the pace of educational practice. In England, for example, the nega-
tive consequences of an excessive focus on testing have included a narrowing of the curric-
ulum, teaching to the test, student anxiety and disaffection (Hutchings 2015). From Mead’s 
standpoint, a more important educational task ‘here and now’ arises from the implications 
of ‘sociality’ for the purpose of education.
Taking on the Role of the Other as the Social Purpose of Education
As discussed above, ‘sociality’, or the ‘social nature of the present’ arises from a simulta-
neous membership of an agent in multiple systems (Mead 1956, p. 339). As time passes, 
sociality involves continual readjustment necessary for incorporating emergent events into 
one’s ongoing experience, nested in these multiple systems (Doan 1956; Natanson 1953). 
Sociality partly resonates with socio-cultural approaches to readiness for school, which see 
the child, her family and school as embedded within social, cultural and historic influences 
(Rogoff 2003; Gardiner and Kosmitzki 2002; Pence and Nsamenang 2008; UNICEF 2012). 
According to these approaches, transition to school involves children adjusting to new 
learning environments, families learning to work within a sociocultural system of a school 
and schools making provisions for admitting new children. Mead’s account highlights that 
the school presents for young children an entirely new social world, with a unique system 
of meaning which may be exciting, anxiety-provoking and at times meaningless. School 
routines, schedules and rules require an ongoing readjustment and sense-making before 
they become familiar and meaningful to young children. Making sense of assessment may 
be even more challenging.
An example of assessment which may be meaningless to young children is Baseline 
Assessment (BA). BA was introduced in 2015 as a replacement for the Early Years Foun-
dation Stage Profile (EYFSP) and bears strong resemblances with ‘baby PISA’ (Pence 
2017; Carr et  al. 2016). The EYFSP was completed through observations of children 
throughout their first year in school and included a range of areas: communication and lan-
guage development; physical, personal, social and emotional development; literacy; maths; 
understanding the world and expressive arts. By contrast, BA is an on-entry test consisting 
of formal assessment tasks focused on communication, language, literacy and mathematics 
that result in a single numerical score for each child (DfE 2014).4 BA disregards research 
confirming that children learn best (and best demonstrate their learning) through support-
ive, collaborative relationships and play activities (Broadhead 2006; Fleer and Richardson 
2009). Conducting BA through formal tasks which children complete on entry to school, in 
new, unfamiliar context is unlikely to allow children to show their ‘true potential’. Children 
4 Baseline Assessment (BA) was withdrawn in 2017, because the different assessments used by schools 
were ‘not sufficiently comparable to create a fair starting point from which to measure pupils’ progress’ 
(DfE 2016b). At the time of writing, BA was reinstated as statutory from September 2020 (DfE 2018).
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in their first weeks of school rarely have the confidence to demonstrate their capabilities 
(Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes 2016). Baseline assessment appears to serve the demands 
of school accountability rather than children’s needs.
An important need upon entering school as a new ‘sociality’ is for children to learn 
to ‘take on the role of the other’, to apprehend what many others may think and feel in 
response to one’s actions (Mead 2002, p. 190). For young children, the development of the 
ability to understand the attitudes of others starts with listening to stories and imaginative 
play. Frequent, uninterrupted ‘story time’ enables children to develop an understanding of 
others and experience time as subjectively lived (Bouton 2014). Stories invite children to 
imagine multiple possibilities, enter the attitude of others and immerse in narrative time. 
As Ricoeur (1980, p. 174) points out, even the simplest story ‘escapes’ the notion of time 
conceived of as ‘a series of instants succeeding one another along an abstract line oriented 
in a single direction’. Heard within the familiar, safe classroom space, stories enable chil-
dren to encounter contingency and unpredictability:
A narrative conclusion can be neither deduced nor predicted. There is no story if our 
attention is not moved along by a thousand contingencies… So rather than being pre-
dictable, a conclusion must be acceptable. (Ricoeur 1980, p. 174)
Class ‘story time’ is also time for ‘being-with-others’ (Ricoeur 1980), for sharing in our 
‘collective vulnerability’ (Lakind and Adsit-Morris 2018, p.36). Exploring ‘collective 
vulnerability’ is also enabled through free, imaginative play. In contrast to ‘structured 
play’ organised around rigid, predetermined goals and rules, free play allows children to 
‘experiment with vulnerability and surprise in ways that could be distressing outside the 
play setting, but are delightful in play’ (Nussbaum 2010, p. 101). Frequent ‘story time’ and 
imaginative play time can be seen as integral to ‘pedagogic slow time’, time with no pre-
specified objectives or goals. A school timetable that includes ‘pedagogic slow time’ could 
enable children to experience time in ways that transcend the ‘ticking clock’ time, thereby 
allowing them to be the ‘agents of their own purpose’ (Lakind and Adsit-Morris 2018, p. 
36).
The Present and Ethics in Educational Practice
Taking the present as the locus of reality has profound implications for teaching and 
assessing children as ethical rather than instrumental activities. In the present as the locus 
of ethical intention, we choose a course of action when our knowledge of the consequences 
of our actions is always emergent and, therefore, limited and uncertain. Instead of striving 
for accurate assessment as a basis for predicting uncertain outcomes, teaching could focus 
instead on apprehending the attitude of children ‘here and now’. Working with a complex 
view of time also means that we need to check the impulse to idealise and to draw away 
(to ‘abstract’) from everyday experience. As argued by Griffin (2002, p. 15), the impulse 
to idealise and abstract from experience reduces ethics to the justification of intention or 
thought as disconnected from action:
When we locate ethics in the intention, or thought, apart from or before the action, 
we are assuming that the likely outcome of the action can be known before the action 
is taken… However, when the intention arises in the action… and when the outcome 
of the action cannot be known in advance of acting, then a different view of ethics is 
required.
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 In the world of events, ethics emerge in the present and are predicated on action that is 
‘determined constructively from situation to situation and is open to continuous revision’ 
(Joas 1996, pp. 161–163). Ethical preoccupations thus shift from the question: ‘What 
should I do to ensure that children reach their full potential at a specified point in the 
future?’ to: ‘What is it like for this child to experience what is going on in class now?’ 
There are no clear answers to this question predetermined in advance of the actions that 
we take and the meaning of these actions can only be discerned in the children’s responses.
A recognition of the present as a locus of reality calls for ethics that are not focused on 
adhering to timeless idealisations but on our interactions ‘here and now’ and the ongoing 
attending to the meanings of actions that are not known in advance. As Mead (1908, p. 
319) points out, moral development ‘consists not in adapting individual natures to the fixed 
realities of a moral universe, but in constantly reconstructing and recreating the world’ as 
we evolve. Educational ethics that embrace the present as the locus of reality call for us 
to be present in our ordinary everyday interactions, for it is in the present that intention, 
thought, freedom and action are lived through, ‘within the constraints of the past, in the 
process of movement into an unknown future’ (Griffin 2002, p. 20). This, in turn, means 
that the responsibility for enhancing children’s educational opportunities is not located in 
assessment policy or an ‘accountability’ system, but in everyday choices made by adults 
who work with children. Importantly, ethics in educational practice arise from a willing-
ness to enter into the attitude of the child and respond to his needs and capabilities ‘here 
and now’. Being responsible for, and responsive to, children is thus about being open to 
ethical meaning which emerges in everyday practice as it unfolds in the present.
Being responsive also means learning from children (Lakind and Adsit-Morris 2018, p. 
37) and making education more childlike (Kohan 2015). Kohan draws on Heraclitus’ inves-
tigation of time as ‘aion’ (as opposed to ‘chronos’) and his observation that ‘Time [aion] 
(is) a child childing (playing); its realm is one of a child’ (p. 57). Time as ‘aion’ designates 
intensity, density and duration rather than successive, numbered movement captured in the 
conception of time as ‘chronos’. ‘Aion’ entails a dimension of living that is ‘more akin to 
a childlike form of being’ with a ‘specific strength, force or intensity’ (p. 57). ‘Aion’ is not 
restricted to childhood as a chronological stage of human life and may be experienced at 
other times within the human lifespan. ‘Childlike’ education may be conceived of as a pro-
cess of unlearning, questioning, experimenting and affirming the importance of not know-
ing (Kohan 2015). Since the ‘intensity’ and ‘density’ of this process are experienced in the 
present, it is important to distinguish the ‘now’ of time as ‘aion’ (time of preoccupation, 
concern) from the ‘now’ in the sense of ‘chronos’ (as an abstract moment in time).
The ethics of being in the present are also concerned with ‘here and now’ as 
‘time–space’. For the post-humanist philosopher and theoretical physicist Karen Barad 
(2007), time is always entangled with place and its ‘materiality’. The clock hung on a 
classroom wall has both metaphorical and material meaning. The metaphor of the ‘tick-
ing clock’ of PISA represents the dominance of quantitative time and the concomitant 
imperatives of speed, acceleration and time compression. But the clock also has a mate-
rial presence in the classroom as an ‘apparatus’ that constitutes particular meanings, bod-
ies, boundaries, inclusions and exclusions (Barad 2007). The classroom clock produces 
material-discursive ‘clocking practices’ that organise the movement of children between 
distinct, time-bound activities, often disrupting the duration and intensity experienced by 
children engaged in an activity (Pacini-Ketchabaw 2012). As a result of ‘clocking prac-
tices’, ‘different subjectivities materialize… as others are excluded’ (p. 158) and ‘particular 
bodies are produced… through which power works its productive effects’ (Barad 2007, 
p. 230). Ethics in educational practice are predicated on the entanglement of time in the 
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materiality of the people, place and apparatus. Importantly, we are always already entan-
gled and ‘to be entangled is not simply to be intertwined with another, as in the joining of 
separate entities, but to lack an independent self-contained existence’ (Barad 2007, p. ix).
Conclusion
This paper has focused on the educational implications of time as emergent in the pre-
sent and irreversible. On this view of time, children’s learning is an event that unfolds 
within everyday practice as an open-ended, dynamic process of constantly readjusting the 
course of action taken by the teacher. This readjustment takes place in the light of chil-
dren’s responses to her actions rather than predetermined outcomes or a fixed assessment 
of children’s capabilities. The possibilities arising from allowing children to experience 
duration and intensity through ‘pedagogic slow time’, open-ended experimentation and 
free, imaginative play are likely to be of greater value than rigidly-controlled projects that 
focus excessively on predetermined outcomes. Like the notes of a tune ‘melting’ into one 
another (Bergson 1910), time spent at school is an inseparable part of childhood. Reducing 
school time to a sequence of separate ‘building blocks’, interventions and formal assess-
ment exercises may disrupt both the intensity of children’s engagement in learning and 
the experience of time as duration, through which school time and home time merge into 
an organic whole, to create the continuity that is often missing in the fragmented lives of 
adults (Alhadeff-Jones 2017).
The implications of ‘temporal complexity’ (Alhadeff-Jones 2017) go beyond changes 
to school timetables. Understanding temporal complexity requires an engagement with 
answers about the nature of time within philosophical thought. What comes to light from 
this engagement is that the enduring dominance of quantitative time within education pol-
icy context may have adverse effects on educational practice. Educational practice organ-
ised solely around the ‘ticking clock’ of PISA introduces the logics of urgency, speed and 
‘early intervention’ into the time–space of childhood, potentially contributing to disaffec-
tion and anxiety at school (Hutchings 2015). Quantitative time is ‘indifferent to human 
beings, to their acting and their suffering’ (Ricoeur 1980, p. 175). It is, therefore, unable to 
generate more complex meanings in teachers’ work and children’s learning that go beyond 
concerns about efficiency and outcomes. Quantitative time fails to measure duration and 
intensity of engagement in the moment. It excludes the possibility that childhood is not 
simply a finite chronological stage but a state of strength and force that makes humans 
more open to not knowing (Kohan 2015). The material consequences of the inclusions and 
exclusions effected through ‘clocking practices’ may render them ethically problematic 
(Pacini-Ketchabaw 2012). In this context, therefore, teachers ought to take a cautious and, 
if necessary, critical approach to the dominance of quantitative time in policy and practice.
Understanding temporal complexity also requires an engagement with the specific con-
tribution of Mead and Prigogine to enduring discussions about the nature of time. What 
Mead and Prigogine add to the ‘five strategies’ for ‘confronting’ temporal complexity 
(Bouton 2014, p. 3) are insights into the present as the locus of reality, emergence and the 
irreversibility of time. The ‘arrow of time’ is a stark reminder of negative, often unpredict-
able consequences of actions that cannot be undone. It is also a signpost to a possibility 
that we may be at a turning point: we are experiencing the continuity of the ‘old order’ 
(Mead 2002, p. 77), determined by the scientific-rationalist thinking of the Enlightenment 
and, simultaneously making ‘readjustments’ to our understanding of the world in light of 
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complexity science. As Prigogine (1996, p. 7) has highlighted, for some time now, we have 
observed the ‘birth of a science that is no longer limited to idealized and simplified situa-
tions but reflects the complexity of the real world, a science that views us and our creativity 
as part of a fundamental trend present at all levels of nature’. Complexity science tells us 
that little is certain about the world in which we live but it is the uncertainty of a contingent 
future that provides an ‘auxiliary to freedom’ (Bouton 2014, p. 210). The plasticity of time 
that Bouton writes about is also an auxiliary to engaging anew with questions about time 
in education. The question about how children should experience their time in education is 
entangled with a more general concern about what, as humans, we should or could do with 
the time that we have to live, in a complex and interrelated world.
Although much critique can be levelled at educational practice that excessively focuses 
on a predetermined future, this does not mean that education should focus solely on the 
‘here and now’. Whilst we experience reality in the present, we naturally also pay atten-
tion to the past and the future. Reconstructing the past in the light of the present gives 
us the benefit of hindsight and enhances our understanding. In anticipating the future, 
we experience emergence as the essence of complex time. The present contains multiple 
courses of action that can be taken and multiple possible futures that may emerge. How-
ever, when a preoccupation with predetermined outcomes becomes the main educational 
modus operandi, as in policy and practice that frame readiness for school as a measure 
of future performance, possibilities close down. If there is, therefore, an ‘urgent’ need for 
change in education, then it is about a shift from instrumentalist practice which sees chil-
dren as ‘means’ to the ends predetermined by adults to educational practice which is more 
sensitive to children’s needs and capabilities ‘here and now’. Childhood is indeed short in 
the timescale of human life but ‘taking time seriously’ entails that we dwell longer in the 
present, as if there were time to waste, for it is in the present that educational practice can 
be merely replicated or approached anew and changed.
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